Emotions, Feelings, and Moods
In pages 115 and 116 of her Philosophy of the Mind: the Basics, Amy Kind explores the intricacies of human emotion, questioning if they can be applied to machines. In annotating the text heavily, I questioned her ideas, trying to “elicit” an explanation on her part. Given that this is impossible, I attempted to answer my own questions following Kind’s line of reasoning. By recognizing where my thinking diverged from hers, I gained a deeper understanding of her explanations and began to form my own rudimentary argument: emotions are much too complex to be limited to such binaries.
First, Kind begins by defining the colloquial term “feeling”, saying it “captures at least two different kinds of mental states: bodily sensations, like pains and itches, and emotions, like fear and anger” (115). Elaborating on this, I believe that bodily sensations arise from interacting with a stimulus, and that it is typically a short term experience. For instance, one sees a spider (the stimulus) and becomes frightened (a bodily sensation). Conversely, emotions are conceptual in nature, not requiring an impetus and lasting longer than a bodily sensation. Love, for example, is an abstract concept that can be grasped without an object of one’s affection prompting it. Kind does not make this distinction; instead, she splits emotion into “basic emotions” and “complex emotions” (116). She argues “Though basic emotions tend to occur more or less automatically, complex emotions are more likely to result from cultural conditioning or previous associations” (Kind 116). I disagree–the subject would feel the emotion regardless. It is an internal process that occurs before society makes its judgment. Then, society and tradition dictate not the presence of the emotion, but rather the appearance of it. For example, picture a husband grieving and anxious about his missing wife. There is a certain standard to which we, the audience, perceive his emotions. If he is too calm, that could admit guilt; if he is too emotional, it could be seen as attention-seeking. Furthermore, if Kind argues that “basic emotions” are automatic in nature, then logically it would follow that they are not conscious decisions. This directly contradicts another viewpoint she presents: “[Emotions] tend not to last longer than just a few minutes, and they may even last for just a few seconds. Emotions are also thought to be intentional states” (Kind 116). Intentionality brings into question the idea of consciousness. In the simplest of definitions, something intentionally done requires a conscious decision to do so. But like said before, some emotions are not intentional. A general feeling of anxiety, perhaps; there could be nothing specific to point to as the stimulus for that anxiety, but the subject experiences it nonetheless.
Presented with contradictory arguments, it is difficult to reveal the true nature of emotions. Kind, in trying to suppose the possibility of emotional machines, makes basic philosophical theories more accessible. With such a close analysis of the text, it becomes apparent that even we cannot come to an agreement on what “emotion” is supposed to mean in a human context.
Works Cited
Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: the Basics, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy048.nclive.org/lib/davidson/detail.action?docID=6121568.
